The SADF, the Border War and Bethlehem's Sappers

Sunday, 11 July 2010

Videos

General Videos on the SADF....

Forged in Flames 1,2 and 3

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https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10151462374962686

The SADF

The SADF, generally considered to be the continent's most formidable military force, consists of four arms. These are the Army, Air Force, Navy and the SA Medical Service (SAMS). All are headquartered in the Pretoria area. The four arms are supplemented by one supporting service, the Chaplain General.

The SADF's structure is monolithic and integrated. Overall command is vested in an officer designated Chief of the South African Defence Force. Appointed from one of the four arms, he is accountable to the Minister of Defence for implementing the South African government"s defence policy.

The chief of each of the four arms commands his own service arm and plans and conducts single-service opera tions, but always within the parameters of the national defence strategy as laid down by the State President on the advice of the State Security Council.

In decision making, the Chief of the SADF is assisted by several councils and committees, the most important being the Defence Command Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Financial Committee. Combined they determine general strategy, lay down management poli cies and undertake financial planning.

Functions

In terms of the Defence Act of 1957, as amended, the SADF's major function is to defend the country against external threats. It is also charged with preventing and suppressing terrorism and internal disorder, preserving life, health and property, and maintaining essential services.

Op Hooper

Operation Hooper

APLA had continued to move up additional forces to the area of Cuito Cuanavale, bringing its strength there to some 25 000 men according to UNITA estimates. While this was achieved only at the expense of depriving other parts of Angola - immediately exploited by UNITA, particularly in the Cazombo Salient which again largely fell under UNITA control. In Cabinda - it did present the danger of a renewed FAPLA offensive before the rainy season set in. This was underlined by the deployment of Cuban troops and T-62 Main Battle Tanks to the Cuito area. This concentration of forces in and around Cuito Cuanavale was promptly engaged by the G-5s which finally forced dispersion to the west and north of the town. The threat, however, remained.

In the light of this continued threat, it was decided that a South African force should assist UNITA in clearing FAPLA forces from the area between the Cuatir and Chambinga Rivers with the aim of reducing FAPLA's foothold east of the Cuito Town and thereby complicating a renewed FAPLA offensive. This continued deployment from 15 December was named Operation Hooper.

Another element of Operation Hooper was the continued employment of G-5s to keep the air base at Cuito Cuanavale out of action, to complicate logistic movement in and around Cuito Cuanavale, and to prevent the repair of the crucial bridge of the Cuito River, thereby hampering FAPLA efforts to regain the initiative. During January the G-5s reportedly fired some 150 and 200 rounds daily at targets in and around Cuito Cuanavale.

Operation Hooper proper began on 13 January 1988 with an attack on the 21 Brigade position next to the Cuatir River to the north-east of Cuito Cuanavale. Contact with the FAPLA force was made at around 18hOO, and fighting went on for some two hours before 21 Brigade broke contact and withdrew, leaving UNITA to establish itself in the area. The South African force suffered no losses during this fighting. FAPLA losses amount to around 250 reported killed; twelve tanks (5 of them captured), one BTR-60, two M-46 130 mm guns (captured), two BM-21's, and ten logistic vehicles (three captured).

21 Brigade regrouped at Tumpo, its original base, re-equipped and launched a counter-attack on the UNITA forces in its lost position on the Cuatir, evicting the UNITA defenders after some heavy fighting. Other FAPLA positions east of the Cuito River were reinforced during this period.

The next South African involvement came with an attack on the positions of 59 Brigade on 14 February. Fighting began with FAPLA breaking contact, but counter-attacking shortly thereafter. The counter-attack failed and 59 Brigade withdrew, having lost some 230 soldiers. Equipment losses came to nine tanks, four BRDMs, one SA-9 launcher vehicle, five BM-21s and seven ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns. The South African force lost four men killed in one of five Ratels hit by direct fire during the FAPLA counter-attack by Russian T55's. One Olifant tank was disabled but came back into action later. UNITA forces simultaneously attacked 21 Brigade in its reoccupied positions, dispersing it yet again.

FAPLA now withdrew 21, 23 and 59 Brigades to their logistic base at Tumpo, preparing a defensive position there. On 25 February a South African force attacked FAPLA positions south of the Tumpo River and a UNITA force supported by South African mechanized elements attacked FAPLA positions at Dala. These attacks were restricted to driving outlying FAPLA forces into the main FAPLA perimeter, the main positions not being attacked. South African losses in this fighting amounted to three killed, four Olifant tanks were immobilised by mines and later repaired, and two Ratels were damaged by indirect fire.

This fighting marked the end of major clashes for the time being, FAPLA forces having been driven from the critical part of south-eastern Angola and confined to the area around Cuito Cuanavale. A South African force remained deployed in the area with a covering mission, however, President Botha suggested that there would continue to be a South African presence in southern Angola until Cuban forces are withdrawn.

FAPLA has deployed at least twelve brigades in 6th Military Region, ten of them along the axis from Menongue to just east of Cuito Cuanavale. Most of a Cuban regiment was reported to have been deployed to protect the headquarters at Nancova, which has also been given strong air defences. Another Cuban regiment may have been deployed to protect Longa.

Observers at the Lornba River fighting reported that the South African G-5 155 mm guns were a key element in defeating FAPLA there. The G-5 proved its ability to cover a wide frontage and to reach deep into the enemy rear with considerable accuracy. The fire control system showed itself able to match the gun, allowing quick target acquisition and engagement with minimum ammunition expenditure. Available information suggests that both spotter aircraft and the South African Seeker RPV were used for target acquisition and to adjust fire. The South African ammunition also proved itself, Soviet light armoured vehicles offering little protection against the 155 mm fragments.

By mid-October the guns had been moved far enough forward to strike targets in Cuito Cuanavale and force the closure of the air base there. The guns apparently opened by destroying the air base's radar and air defence systems and went on to destroy aircraft on the ground, crater the runway and generally render operations extremely hazardous. Continued shelling is reported to be keeping the air base effectively closed and to be preventing the repair of the critical bridge over the Cuito River, which was dropped by a South African "smart" weapon after, according to FAPLA, earlier haying been damaged by frogmen.

While there has been no detailed public comment, the SADF is clearly very satisfied with its new artillery systems. The SA Artillery has also obviously come far in developing a new doctrine to match the capabilities of its new equipment. Given that it achieved its successes in this fighting largely with towed G-5s, it is interesting to consider how the coming introduction into service of the highly mobile G-6 SP 155 mm gun will further affect the Army's doctrine and capabilities.

While the SADF has not given any details, SAAF support would appear to have consisted chiefly of battlefield interdiction, much of the close air support role having been passed to the long-range G-5s. This allowed the SAAF to minimise exposure of its small fighter fleet to the comprehensive Angolan air defence system.

UNITA leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, has also said that the SAAF was instrumental in allowing him to swiftly concentrate and deploy his semi-conventional forces to meet the FAPLA advance. It seems likely that this involved moving UNITA troops from the "northern front" in the 3rd Military Region to the defensive positions along the Lomba River in time to stop the southern arm of FAPLA's offensive there. Transport operations may thus also have been a key element in defeating FAPLA, allowing the most efficient deployment of UNIT A forces to meet and stop first the diversionary and then the main arm of the offensive.

South African armour and infantry would appear to have fought with their usual verve - moving faster than the terrain would seem to allow, and delivering massive violence suddenly once in contact. Their ability to move rapidly, manoeuvre to gain the best relative position, and then to engage and destroy an enemy force in the extremely dense bush and, often, soft sand of south-eastern Angola is testimony to an exacting training system.-Visibility in some parts of the battle area is below 100 m, even less in places; the sand too soft to walk in with comfort. The toughness and reliability of the Ratel ICVs and of the Samil-series logistic vehicles is also a major factor. The Ratel-90 also appears to have again proven itself in the anti-tank role, although it was developed as a fire support vehicle and not as a tank destroyer. The Ratel-81 saw action for the first time, giving the mechanized infantry a highly mobile source of "in house" fire support. The equally new SP 20 mm AAA Ystervark celebrated its entry into service by bringing down at least one MiG-23.

Operations Moduler and Hooper saw the first deployment of the Olifant MBT, which proved itself a tough and reliable vehicle able to absorb battle damage and to move through the heaviest bush. Its gun and fire control system proved more than capable of dealing with the opposing T-55s - although most engagements in the dense bush of the region were probably at too short a range to really test the fire control system. Operating in what must be prototypical "non armour terrain", the Olifant in fact proved particularly valuable for its ability to shrug off the restrictions of the heavy bush, and soft sand to get to where it was needed and to deal with the enemy.

Op Modular

The southern element of the FAPLA offensive was launched from the area of Cuito Cuanavale on 14 August 1987. The brigades involved here were 25 Brigade, already deployed east of the Cuito River at Tumpo, and 16, 21,47, 59, 66, 8, and 13 Brigades, which were deployed for this operation. Additional forces were held in reserve.

Intelligence having indicated that FAPLA had deployed a large number of armoured vehicles around Cuito Cuanavale, a team of South African officers was detached to UNITA to assist in the preparation of their anti-tank plan. UNTTA's detailed knowledge of the region facilitated a careful analysis of the likely approach routes and battlefield, and these were thoroughly prepared and mined. South Africa also agreed to provide air support if needed. In August, when the full scale of the FAPLA offensive had become clear, it was decided to also deploy South African artillery south of the Lomba River to support UNITA as needed. This deployment in support of UNITA was named "Operation Moduler".

FAPLA advanced with two brigades along each of two routes: 16 and 21 Brigades from Chambinga to the source of the Cunzumbia River, southward along its eastern bank to the confluence with Lomba River, and from there towards Mavinga; 47 and 59 Brigades from the area of the sources of the Hube, Vimpulu and Mianei Rivers to the source of the Cuzizi River, southward along its western bank to the Lomba, and from there towards Mavinga. Both forces moved very slowly through often thick bush, averaging 4 km daily and generally digging in for the night around 16h00.

One factor which slowed down their advance was uncertainty concerning the extent to which South Africa would support UNITA. FAPLA had already learned that South African mechanized forces move fast and strike hard, and that the SAAF's fighter-bombers are dangerous. The dangers of the sudden appearance of a mechanized force and of air attack, mandated relative concentration - both to deal with a mechanized attack and to stay within the umbrella of the accompanying air-defence systems, and the careful concealment of stationary forces. Neither requirement is conducive to fast movement in south-eastern Angola. The danger of ambush will have served to further slow the advance. Another factor was ongoing UNITA activity in the rear of the advancing forces and to the west of Cuito Cuanavale, hampering logistic support and the logistic movements of follow-on forces.

As more intelligence became available concerning the strength of the advancing FAPLA force, South Africa decided to deploy a mechanized force to block the advance of FAPLA's 47 Brigade at the Lomba River. This disrupted FAPLA's planned crossing of the Lomba, various FAPLA attempts to establish bridgeheads being defeated by UNITA forces supported by SA Army and SWA Territory Force elements. 47 Brigade suffered considerable losses in this fighting.

There was particularly heaving fighting on 13 and 14 September, when a FAPLA force crossed the Lomba and overran a UNITA position, killing some 40 UNITA men. FAPLA did not exploit, however, and this bridgehead was soon cleaned up. There were six engagements involving the South African force over these two days. Six South African soldiers were killed, two APCs were destroyed and two damaged in the fighting. The FAPLA force involved - an independent "tactical group" - suffered 382 men killed and lost six tanks and various other vehicles captured.

Angolan claims suggest that the SAAF had meanwhile set about isolating the battlefield. Specific claims include air strikes which disrupted FAPLA attempts to move up additional forces between 20 and 30 September. No further reinforcement was attempted by FAPLA thereafter.

There was a fierce clash on 3 October 1987, and this marked the turning point of the fighting. FAPLA's 47 Brigade was engaged and severely mauled, withdrawing without their main equipment in disorder during the night of 3/4 October to join up with 59 Brigade. Both brigades then withdrew to the area of their jumping-off point. 16 and 21 Brigades were also withdrawn. 47 Brigade lost 250 k

illed and a large amount of equipment destroyed or captured. Among the equipment losses were three SA-8 and two SA-9 launcher vehicles, eighteen tanks, three ICVs, sixteen APCs, five armoured cars, six 122 mm guns, the equipment of three light AAA batteries, and 120 logistic vehicles.

UNITA followed up the defeat of this FAPLA force, crossing the Lomba on 4 October and evicting FAPLA from their positions along the River.

FAPLA now adopted a defensive posture while it strove to move additional brigades into the area. 16 and 21 Brigades were deployed at the source of the Chambinga River, 59 Brigade and a "tactical group" between the Vimpulu and Mianei Rivers.

By mid-October the South African G-5s had advanced to within range of Cuito Cuanavale, quickly forcing the closure of the air base. They then turned to disrupting FAPLA use of the town and movement through it, and prevented the repair of the crucial.

bridge of the Cuito River. FAPLA forces east of the Cuito were hit by supply shortages as a result. Air support, already severely restricted by the presence of US supplied Stingers, was now further limited, the Angolan Air Force having been driven back to the air base at Menongue, 150 km west of Cuito Cuanavale - bringing longer reaction times and less time in the target area. The shelling also forced the withdrawal of the FAPLA headquarters to Nancova on the road to Menongue.

The major fighting involving the South African force was between 9 and 16 November, in the area of the source of the Chambinga and Hube Rivers. Sixteen South Africans died in this fighting. FAPLA losses to the combined South African/UNITA force were 525 killed and 33 tanks, three SA-13 launcher vehicles, fifteen APCs and 111 logistic vehicles captured or destroyed.

This fighting effectively ended Operation Moduler which wound up in mid-December.

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Saturday, 12 June 2010

Area of SADF / Angolan Operations and the assigned military units.

SADF Border Bases

FAPLA HQ - Lucusse (39 and 43 Brigades)

FAPLA Log Base - Tumpo

FAPLA HQ - Nancova

PORT - Namibe

UNITA HQ - Jamba

Koevoet HQ - Oshakati

SWAPOL Training Centre - Ondangwa South

Border Post - Oshikango

31 Bn - Alpha Base - Caprivi - became 201 Bn

WaterPump/Dam - Omundaungilo

School - Anamulenge

School - St.Marys Mission Station

SWAPO Training Camp - Moscow - Cassinga

SWAPO western Front HQ/Log base - Vietnam - Chetequera

SWAPO Transit/Training Camp - Cassinga

FAPLA Mech Base - Techamutete

SWAPO Camp - Chatva

SWAPO camp - Dombondola

SADF Base - Katima Mulilo

SADF Base - Elundu

SADF Base - Nkongo

SWAPO Base - Cinzenbela - Zambia

SWAPO Base - Ngweni Pools - Zambia

SWAPO Base - Njinje Woods - Zambia

SWAPO HQ - Imusho - Zambia

SWAPO Base - Muongo - "Muongo2"

SWAPO Base - Oncua

SWAPO Base - Henhombe

SWAPO Base - Heque

SWAPO Base - Huambango

SWAPO Base - Ombiro

SWAPO Base - Capindi

SWAPO Base - Franca

SWAPO Base - Ifitu

SADF Base - Ondangwa

SWAPO Base - Mulola

SWAPO Base - Chitumba

SAAF Fwd Base/HAAG - Mulemba

SWAPO HQ - Evale

SWAPO Transit base - Mupa

FAPLA Base - Mongua

Power Station - Ruacana

SWAPO Base - "QFL/Smokeshell" - Ionde

SWAPO Main HQ - Lubango

SWAPO Transit base - Chitado

SWAPO Log base - Chitado

SWAPO Tactical HQ - Chitado

SWAPO HQ - NW Front - Xangongo

SWAPO HQ - N Front - Ongiva

Radar Site - Cahama

Radar Site - Chibemba

FAPLA Base - Peu Peu

FAPLA Base - Humbe

SWAPO HQ - Bambi

SWAPO Base - Cheraquera

Dirt Strip - Ionde

SWAPO HQ - E Front - Mupa

FAPLA Base - Cahama

SWAPO tactical HQ - Cuvelai

Hydro Power Station - Ruacana

Dam Wall - Calueque

School - College - Ongwediva

Delta Pipeline - ????

SADF Base - Eenhana

SWAPO NF HQ - Anhanca

SADF Base - Onhangwena

SWAPO CF HQ - 35km N Cassinga

SWAPO THTC Centre - Lubango

SWAPO transit camp - Lubango

Alpha Tower - Oshikango

School - Tsandi

SADF Base - Okalongo

Power Substation - Ogandjera

SWAPO Command Centre - Peu Peu - CF HQ

SWAPO Log Base - "Katanga" - NW of Xangongo

SADF Border Post - Wenela

SADF Border Post - Ngoma

SADF Border Post - Katima Mulilo

SWAPO Mech Train Camp - Jamba

SWAPO Training Camp - Ongulumbashe

SWAPO camp - Kalavi

SWAPO camp - Omulola

SWAPO camp - Kalome

SADF HQ - Oshakati - Sector 10

SADF HQ - Rundu - Sector 20

SADF HQ - Katima Mulilo - Sector 70

SAMS HQ - Oshakati

SWAPOL HQ - Oshakati

SADF Main Base/HQ - Ruacana - 51Bn

SADF Main Base/HQ - Ondangwa - 53Bn

SADF Main Base/HQ - Eenhana - 54Bn

SADF Main Base/HQ - Omathiya - 61 Mech

SADF Main Base/HQ - Oshakati - 25 Engineer

SADF Main Base/LOG HQ - Ondangwa - 5 Maintenance

SADF Training Centre - Oshivelo

SWATF Main Base/HQ - Ondangwa - 101Bn

SWATF Main Base/HQ - Opuwa - 102Bn

SAMS HQ - Rundu

SAAF HQ - Rundu

SWAPOL HQ - Rundu

SADF Base/HQ - Nepara- 55Bn

SWATF Base/HQ - Rundu - 202Bn

SWATF Base/HQ - Omega - 201Bn (bushman)

SWATF Base/HQ - Mangetti Dune - 203Bn

Buffalo Base - 32Bn - Buffalo

SWATF 30HQ - Otjiwarango

Monday, 1 February 2010

40 days and klaar out time

Min Dae Manne

For all the ou manne that returned from the border, it was a hard change back to being a civvie as none of the returning troops could talk about their tours to Angola or wherever due to a secrecy agreement. This to be honest was crap as most of us did compare our experiences, losses and exploits.....

We packed up all our shit including some mementoes collected in Angola, for some this was Tokarevs or even deactivated or spent munitions. a lot of these mementoes were thrown under trucks on the runway curtain at Ondangwa when the MP's arrived to carry out searches.

On arrival back in Bethlehem for the last 40 days of my 2 year's national service, we were given some trauma counciling to make sense of what we had gone though and to ensure the civvies would be safe with us back in amongst them. This was done in a few sessions of discussing our tour with a head doctor from main base. Once you were cleared as being sane and ready for civilian life, and not the dreaded bossies. We were pretty much left to enjoy the remaining days with little influence from the army. I was actually caught going awol out of 21 to visit a girl friend in town - not a nice experience when you have like a week to go. For the rest of the time we stood guard and we were sort of just monitored until our clearing out parade - what a day this was.

Some years later an envelope arrived and inside was the Pro Patria Medal ( ProNutro), the General Service Medal and the Southern Africa medal all issued for actions in and outside South Africa. A bit pissed that no parade was arranged for presenting this, some sort of after thought - oh, we better give him something for his time and effort. I guess my friends who spilt blood and did not make it back received theirs posthumously. I wonder how many have been re-patriated back to their motherland, South Africa by the SANDF.

The average South African ex-servicemen was found to be in another situation after returning home, being at the mercy of the SADF and the government for a one month call-up for a camp every year.

Sunday, 31 January 2010

The Battles of the Forgotten War in Angola, SE Zambia and South West Africa

The SADF Border Operations by year:

Operation Savannah - Angola 1975

The 1st large scale cross border operation of the bushwar. A covert operation by 4 SADF battlegroups [Foxbat, Zulu, Alfa and Bravo] in support of the pro Western Freedom movements [UNITA and FNLA] in Angola..." In 30 days, the SADF covers over 3000 km's into Angola to within artillery range of the capital of Luanda.

Battle for Ebo - Angola 1975

The Battle for Ebo during November 1975 will be remembered as a black day for the South African soldiers and those fighting along side them.

The Battle of Bridge 14 - Angola 1975

The Battle of Bridge 14 took place in December 1975 during Operation Savannah in Angola. It represented a major defeat of the communist forces in Angola - the MPLA and the Cubans - by South African troops.

Battle of Bridge 14

This was a battle fought at a bridge on the Nhia River on 22 December 1975. The bridge had been blown by retreating enemy forces who were being pursued by the SADF. South African Sappers successfully rebuilt the bridge under heavy fire, allowing the amoured column to advance and route the enemy on the opposite bank.

Danny Roxo famously single-handedly killed twelve Cuban and MPLA soldiers during a reconnaissance of the bridge, an action for which he was awarded the Honoris Crux.

Several other Honoris Crux medals were awarded for bravery during this battle, some posthumously.

Operation Carlota - Angola 1975

Cuban assistance to FAPLA.

Operation Cobra - Angola 1975

Attack of SWAPO elements by Bravo Group under Col. Jan Breytenbach.

Operation Silver - Angola 1977 - 1983

Official support to UNITA. Renamed to Op Disa in 1983.

Operation Kropduif - Angola October 1977

The Battle of Eheki involving 1-Recce, 2-Recce and 32-Battalion.

Operation Bruilof - Angola 1978

Utilising Ratel 20's, Battlegroup Juliet (61 Mech BN GP) attacked several enemy positions in Angola.

Operation Seiljag - Angola 1978

Involving 32 Battalion.

Operation Rextill - Angola August 1978

Op by the SADF in retaliation to SWAPO's attack on Katima Mulilo, codenamed Op Revenge.

Operation Reindeer - Angola 1978

Crossborder operation launched under the new South African policy of hitting SWAPO sanctuaries in neighboring Angola, was really three separate attacks linked only by timing and overall purpose. They were: an airborne assault on Cassinga (Codename "Moscow"), some 250 kilometers inside Angola; an overland assault on a series of SWAPO bases near Chetequera (Codename "Vietnam"), twenty-five kilometers north of the Angolan border, and a helicopter-borne sweep through a series of small SWAPO bases seventeen to twenty-one kilometers east of Chetequera."

The heliborne assualt involved 32 Bn, which attacked the SWAPO Base camps of Omepepa, Namuidi and Henhombe. As part of the attack on Chetequera, Dombondola was also a target.

The Battle of Cassinga - Angola 1978 (Codename "Moscow")

The Battle of Cassinga (4 May 1978) was a controversial South African airborne attack on a South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) base (or refugee camp) located at the former town of Cassinga.

Operation Safraan - Zambia 1979

Some of the targets in Zambia were areas around Sinjembela, Omatako Omaramba and the forest area of Njena

Operation Rekstok - Zambia 1979

Some of the targets in Angola were bases around Muongo, Oncua, Henhombe and Heque.

Attack on Nova Catengue - Angola 1979

An ANC Training Camp that was attacked and bombed by the SAAF on 14 March 1979.

Operation Dice - Zambia 1979

Destruction of Zambian bridges by 1-Recce Alpha Group.

Operation Tiro a Tiro - Angola 1980

32 Bn attack on Savate, a major FAPLA base.

For more info on the attack on Savate, click HERE.

Operation Skeptic - Angola 1980

Attack on the SWAPO stronghold at Chifufua in Angola codenamed "Smokeshell" [May - June 1980], and developed into an extended operation which produced the first serious clashes between the SADF and the Angolan Army and mechanised elements of SWAPO.

Operation Beanbag - Mozambique 1981

Raid of a MK stronghold in Matola near Maputo.

Operation KAT - Mozambique 1981

Destruction of the ANC headquarters in Mozambique.

Operations Carnation, Protea and Daisy - Angola 1981

Operation PROTEA was launched on August 23, 1981. Its objectives were to destroy SWAPO's command and training center at Xangongo and to destroy SWAPO's logistic bases at Xangongo and Ongiva.

Cambeno Valley - Angola 1981

Insertion point of 5 Recce during Operation Super

Operation Kerslig - Angola 1981

Attack on oil installations in Luanda harbour by Special Forces Operators from 1- and 4-Recce.

Operation Meebos - Angola 1982

Consisted of a number of air attacks on SWAPO's command centres,including the destruction of Mupa in Angola.

Operation Dolfyn - Angola 1983

Op included artillery, armoured car, anti tank and mortors as well as 61 Mech. Operation against SWAPO north of Cuvelai and search and destroy op against SWAPO west and east of the Cunene river, also to ensure FAPLA pulled out of Cuvelai.

Operation Altar - Angola 1982 - 1984

SADF assistance to RENAMO [Later became OP Mila].

Operation Yahoo - Lesotho 1982

Raid on the ANC facilities in Maseru Lesotho by 5-Recce.

Operation Phoenix - Angola 1983

In February 1983 SWAPO launched a new offensive by deploying a special force of 1700 guerillas into Ovambo. Phoenix was the counterstrike by the SADF against the SWAPO infiltration.

Operation Skerwe - Mozambique 1983

SAAF air strikes on ANC targets in Matola near Maputo.

Operation Vine - Mozambique 1983

Raid on the ANC offices in Maputo by 1-Recce.

Operation Askari - Angola 1983 to 1984

The primary aim of Operation ASKARI, "was to disrupt the planned infiltration of SWAPO's special units into South West Africa.

Operation Argon - Angola 1985

4-Recce raid on oil storage tankers in Cabinda - Angola, which led to the capture of Capt. Wynand du Toit [later promoted to Major].

Operation Plexi - Botswana 1985

Raid on the ANC facilities in Gaborone Botswana by 1-, 4- and 5-Recce.

Operation Boswilger - Angola 1985

After the SADF withdrawal from Angola on 1 April 1985, SWAPO launched operations across the border from bases in Angola. Boswilger was the counter.

Operation Weldmesh -Wallpaper - Angola 1985

A short-term operation [at the request of UNITA]. The op involved the deployment of a Multiple Rocket Launcher Unit and succeeded in stopping the southward movement of FAPLA units in and around the Angolan town of Mavinga.

Operation Alpha Centuari - Angola 1985

An operation aimed [and that succeeded] in stopping a FAPLA advance on the UNITA stronghold of Jamba.

Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer - Angola 1985 - 1988

Operations which included the Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga battles.

Mavinga - Angola

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale - Angola, the last major offensive in Angola.

Operation Kodak - Zimbabwe 1986

Raid on ANC offices in Harare Zimbabwe by 5-Recce.

Operation Colosseum - Angola 1986

5-Recce raid on SWAPO bases in Angola.

Operation Rolio - Zambia 1987

Raid on ANC offices in Livingstone Zambia by 1-Recce.

Operation Coolidge - Angola 1987

Op by 4-Recce to destroy the Cuito River bridge.

Operation Prone - Angola 1988

Operation Hilti / Excite [May - June 1988] - The last major firefight that 32 Battalion, together with elements from 61 Mech, participated in, within Angola. It was during this battle that a group of Mig 23's attack the Calueque Dam, seriously damaging the bridge and water pipeline and killing several NSM's from 8 SAI.

Operation Linger - Angola 1988

Operation Merlyn - Angola 1989

Operation Displace - The withdrawl of the SADF from the operational area 1988 - 1989