APLA had continued to move up additional forces to the area of Cuito Cuanavale, bringing its strength there to some 25 000 men according to UNITA estimates. While this was achieved only at the expense of depriving other parts of Angola - immediately exploited by UNITA, particularly in the Cazombo Salient which again largely fell under UNITA control. In Cabinda - it did present the danger of a renewed FAPLA offensive before the rainy season set in. This was underlined by the deployment of Cuban troops and T-62 Main Battle Tanks to the Cuito area. This concentration of forces in and around Cuito Cuanavale was promptly engaged by the G-5s which finally forced dispersion to the west and north of the town. The threat, however, remained.
In the light of this continued threat, it was decided that a South African force should assist UNITA in clearing FAPLA forces from the area between the Cuatir and Chambinga Rivers with the aim of reducing FAPLA's foothold east of the Cuito Town and thereby complicating a renewed FAPLA offensive. This continued deployment from 15 December was named Operation Hooper.
Another element of Operation Hooper was the continued employment of G-5s to keep the air base at Cuito Cuanavale out of action, to complicate logistic movement in and around Cuito Cuanavale, and to prevent the repair of the crucial bridge of the Cuito River, thereby hampering FAPLA efforts to regain the initiative. During January the G-5s reportedly fired some 150 and 200 rounds daily at targets in and around Cuito Cuanavale.
Operation Hooper proper began on 13 January 1988 with an attack on the 21 Brigade position next to the Cuatir River to the north-east of Cuito Cuanavale. Contact with the FAPLA force was made at around 18hOO, and fighting went on for some two hours before 21 Brigade broke contact and withdrew, leaving UNITA to establish itself in the area. The South African force suffered no losses during this fighting. FAPLA losses amount to around 250 reported killed; twelve tanks (5 of them captured), one BTR-60, two M-46 130 mm guns (captured), two BM-21's, and ten logistic vehicles (three captured).
21 Brigade regrouped at Tumpo, its original base, re-equipped and launched a counter-attack on the UNITA forces in its lost position on the Cuatir, evicting the UNITA defenders after some heavy fighting. Other FAPLA positions east of the Cuito River were reinforced during this period.
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The next South African involvement came with an attack on the positions of 59 Brigade on 14 February. Fighting began with FAPLA breaking contact, but counter-attacking shortly thereafter. The counter-attack failed and 59 Brigade withdrew, having lost some 230 soldiers. Equipment losses came to nine tanks, four BRDMs, one SA-9 launcher vehicle, five BM-21s and seven ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns. The South African force lost four men killed in one of five Ratels hit by direct fire during the FAPLA counter-attack by Russian T55's. One Olifant tank was disabled but came back into action later. UNITA forces simultaneously attacked 21 Brigade in its reoccupied positions, dispersing it yet again.
FAPLA now withdrew 21, 23 and 59 Brigades to their logistic base at Tumpo, preparing a defensive position there. On 25 February a South African force attacked FAPLA positions south of the Tumpo River and a UNITA force supported by South African mechanized elements attacked FAPLA positions at Dala. These attacks were restricted to driving outlying FAPLA forces into the main FAPLA perimeter, the main positions not being attacked. South African losses in this fighting amounted to three killed, four Olifant tanks were immobilised by mines and later repaired, and two Ratels were damaged by indirect fire.
This fighting marked the end of major clashes for the time being, FAPLA forces having been driven from the critical part of south-eastern Angola and confined to the area around Cuito Cuanavale. A South African force remained deployed in the area with a covering mission, however, President Botha suggested that there would continue to be a South African presence in southern Angola until Cuban forces are withdrawn.
FAPLA has deployed at least twelve brigades in 6th Military Region, ten of them along the axis from Menongue to just east of Cuito Cuanavale. Most of a Cuban regiment was reported to have been deployed to protect the headquarters at Nancova, which has also been given strong air defences. Another Cuban regiment may have been deployed to protect Longa.
Observers at the Lornba River fighting reported that the South African G-5 155 mm guns were a key element in defeating FAPLA there. The G-5 proved its ability to cover a wide frontage and to reach deep into the enemy rear with considerable accuracy. The fire control system showed itself able to match the gun, allowing quick target acquisition and engagement with minimum ammunition expenditure. Available information suggests that both spotter aircraft and the South African Seeker RPV were used for target acquisition and to adjust fire. The South African ammunition also proved itself, Soviet light armoured vehicles offering little protection against the 155 mm fragments.
By mid-October the guns had been moved far enough forward to strike targets in Cuito Cuanavale and force the closure of the air base there. The guns apparently opened by destroying the air base's radar and air defence systems and went on to destroy aircraft on the ground, crater the runway and generally render operations extremely hazardous. Continued shelling is reported to be keeping the air base effectively closed and to be preventing the repair of the critical bridge over the Cuito River, which was dropped by a South African "smart" weapon after, according to FAPLA, earlier haying been damaged by frogmen.
While there has been no detailed public comment, the SADF is clearly very satisfied with its new artillery systems. The SA Artillery has also obviously come far in developing a new doctrine to match the capabilities of its new equipment. Given that it achieved its successes in this fighting largely with towed G-5s, it is interesting to consider how the coming introduction into service of the highly mobile G-6 SP 155 mm gun will further affect the Army's doctrine and capabilities.
While the SADF has not given any details, SAAF support would appear to have consisted chiefly of battlefield interdiction, much of the close air support role having been passed to the long-range G-5s. This allowed the SAAF to minimise exposure of its small fighter fleet to the comprehensive Angolan air defence system.
UNITA leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, has also said that the SAAF was instrumental in allowing him to swiftly concentrate and deploy his semi-conventional forces to meet the FAPLA advance. It seems likely that this involved moving UNITA troops from the "northern front" in the 3rd Military Region to the defensive positions along the Lomba River in time to stop the southern arm of FAPLA's offensive there. Transport operations may thus also have been a key element in defeating FAPLA, allowing the most efficient deployment of UNIT A forces to meet and stop first the diversionary and then the main arm of the offensive.
South African armour and infantry would appear to have fought with their usual verve - moving faster than the terrain would seem to allow, and delivering massive violence suddenly once in contact. Their ability to move rapidly, manoeuvre to gain the best relative position, and then to engage and destroy an enemy force in the extremely dense bush and, often, soft sand of south-eastern Angola is testimony to an exacting training system.-Visibility in some parts of the battle area is below 100 m, even less in places; the sand too soft to walk in with comfort. The toughness and reliability of the Ratel ICVs and of the Samil-series logistic vehicles is also a major factor. The Ratel-90 also appears to have again proven itself in the anti-tank role, although it was developed as a fire support vehicle and not as a tank destroyer. The Ratel-81 saw action for the first time, giving the mechanized infantry a highly mobile source of "in house" fire support. The equally new SP 20 mm AAA Ystervark celebrated its entry into service by bringing down at least one MiG-23.
Operations Moduler and Hooper saw the first deployment of the Olifant MBT, which proved itself a tough and reliable vehicle able to absorb battle damage and to move through the heaviest bush. Its gun and fire control system proved more than capable of dealing with the opposing T-55s - although most engagements in the dense bush of the region were probably at too short a range to really test the fire control system. Operating in what must be prototypical "non armour terrain", the Olifant in fact proved particularly valuable for its ability to shrug off the restrictions of the heavy bush, and soft sand to get to where it was needed and to deal with the enemy.
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